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1 Introduction
The intention of the present report is to provide a Kripke-style semantics for
Artemov’s Logic of Proofs, LP, [1, 2]. Of course additional machinery must
be added to that which is standard in Kri[pke semantics. It takes the form
of what we might call, informally, possible justification, or possible evidence.
To take an intuitive example, what might serve as possible evidence for the
statement, “George Bush is editor of the New York Times?” Clearly the edi-
torial page of any copy of the New York Times would serve, while no page of
Mad Magazine would do (although the magazine might very well contain the
claim that George Bush does edit the Times). Note that possible evidence
need not be evidence of a fact. Nor need it be decisive—it could happen that
the New York Times decides to omit its editor’s name. Nonetheless, what
the Times prints on this subject would count as evidence, and what Mad
prints would not. It is this notion of possible evidence that will be added
to standard Kripke machinery, to produce a sound and strongly complete
semantics for LP. I will also use this semantics to provide alternative proofs
of two well-known results concerning LP.
2 Background
This report, in a sense, continues a previous technical report, “A Semantic
Proof of the Realizability of Modal Logic in the Logic of Proofs,” [3]. A
certain amount of background material is duplicated from that report.
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Proof polynomials are built from variables and constants by three oper-
ations “·” (application), “!” (proof checker), and “+” (union), where proof
checker is a unary operation and application and union are binary ones.
Under the standard provability interpretation, proof polynomials denote the
obvious computable operations on proofs.
The axioms and rules of LP are:
A0. classical axioms
A1. t:(F ⊃ G) ⊃ (s:F ⊃ (t·s):G) (application)
A2. t:F ⊃ F (explicit reflexivity)
A3. t:F ⊃ !t:(t:F ) (proof checker)
A4. s:F ⊃ (s+t):F , t:F ⊃ (s+t):F (sum, or union)
R1. Modus Ponens
R2. ` c:A, where A ∈A0-A4,
c is any proof constant. (axiom necessitation)
There is an analogue of the Necessitation Rule
` F
` F
in LP. It has the form of an admissible rule of Explicit Necessitation ([1, 2]):
` F
` p:F for some proof polynomial p.
Rule R2 needs some comment. A constant specification is a mapping
from axioms to constants. It is injective if it is 1 − 1. A proof using R2
determines a constant specification—map axioms used in the proof to the
constants assigned by R2 applications, and axioms not used to arbitrary
constants. Conversely, we can start with a constant specification, and in-
sist that applications of R2 introduce constants into proofs according to it.
I will show soundness and completeness relative to an arbitrary constant
specification.
The Logic of Proofs is an explicit version of S4: the “forgetful” pro-
jection of LP, where t:F is systematically replaced by F , coincides with
S4 ([2], Lemma 9.1). The key property of LP is its ability to emulate
the whole of S4, the Realizability Theorem (Theorem 9.4 from [2]). This
theorem states that if S4 derives F then one can find an assignment r of
proof polynomials to the ’s of F in such a way that the resulting for-
mula F r is derivable in LP. Artemov’s proof of the Realization Theorem
goes through cut-elimination for S4, which puts serious limits on finding
explicit counterparts for other modal logics, since many of them do not
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enjoy cut-elimination. An alternative, semantic-based, proof was given in
[3]. One of Artemov’s problems (number 1 from the list of problems posted
on http://www.cs.gc.cuny.edu/∼sartemov) asks for a semantics for LP.
The semantics presented here evolved out of the work in [3].
Any terminology or results not included here can be found in [2].
3 Presentation of an LP Semantics
Let C be a constant specification, an assignment of a proof constant to
each axiom, A0 - A4. Since this can be arbitrary, whether c:X is provable
or not, where c is a specific constant and X is an axiom, depends on C.
Consequently the semantics will be relative to constant specification C.
F = 〈G,R〉 is a frame in the usual sense, where G is a set of states and
R is a binary relation on G. It is assumed that R is reflexive and transitive,
hence F is a frame for S4.
I next want to introduce a formal version of possible evidence. Now, if t
is a proof polynomial and Γ is a state, intuitively t can serve as evidence for
certain assertions in state Γ, and not for other assertions. Consequently we
can identify the ‘possible evidence’ supplied by t at Γ with a set of formulas.
Of course such a set must meet certain conditions—these will be given below.
Given a frame F = 〈G,R〉, a possible evidence function E is a mapping
from states and proof polynomials to sets of formulas. We can read X ∈
E(Γ, t) as “t is possible evidence for X in state Γ.” Before stating the
conditions the evidence function must satisfy, I need to introduce a few
operations on formula sets.
1. If S and T are sets of formulas, S · T = {Y | X ⊃ Y ∈ S and X ∈
T for some formula X}
2. If S is a set of formulas and !t is a proof polynomial, (!t)S = {t:X |
X ∈ S}
Now, here are the conditions that must be met by evidence function E :
Monotonicity For each proof polynomial t, and for all Γ,∆ ∈ G,
ΓR∆ implies E(Γ, t) ⊆ E(∆, t)
Constant Condition For each formula X, with C(X) = c,
X ∈ E(Γ, c), for each Γ ∈ G.
Application For all proof polynomials s, t, and for each Γ ∈ G,
E(Γ, s) · E(Γ, t) ⊆ E(Γ, s · t).
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Proof Checker For each proof polynomial t, and for each Γ ∈ G,
(!t)E(Γ, t) ⊆ E(Γ, !t).
Sum For all proof polynomials s, t, and for each Γ ∈ G,
E(Γ, s) ∪ E(Γ, t) ⊆ E(Γ, s+ t).
As usual, a forcing relation  between states and formulas is introduced.
At the atomic level, it is specified arbitrarily—this is part of the definition
of a particular model. Then it is extended to arbitrary formulas according
to the following rules. For each Γ ∈ G:
1. Γ  ⊥ never holds—written Γ 6 ⊥.
2. Γ  (X ⊃ Y ) if and only if Γ 6 X or Γ  Y .
3. Γ  (t:X) if and only if X ∈ E(Γ, t) and, for every ∆ ∈ G with ΓR∆,
∆  X.
Item 3 above intuitively says, we have t :X at a state provided X is
necessarily the case at that state, and t can serve as possible evidence for X
at that state.
Soundness and completeness can be shown for axiomatic LP relative to
the semantics above. But with the same effort, it can be shown for a more
restricted class of models, and this turns out to be of particular use. So,
call models defined as above weak models for LP. The additional condition
I want to impose might be summarized as “whatever must be so, must be
so for a reason.” The requirement is that of being
Fully Explanatory If ∆  X for every ∆ ∈ G such that ΓR∆, then for
some proof polynomial t we have Γ  (t:X).
If the Fully Explanatory condition is also met, I say M = 〈G,R, E ,〉
is an LP-model. If it is necessary to be absolutely precise, it is a model
relative to the constant specification C.
4 Soundness
The methodology for proving axiomatic soundness is the usual one—verify
validity of the axioms, and show the rules preserve validity. I’ll consider two
axioms as representative.
First consider an application axiom—validity arguments for most other
axioms follow a similar pattern. SupposeM = 〈G,R, E ,〉 is an LP-model,
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Γ ∈ G, and Γ  t:(F ⊃ G) and Γ  s:F . It must be shown that Γ  (t · s):
G. Let ∆ ∈ G be an arbitrary state with ΓR∆. Since Γ  t : (F ⊃ G),
∆  (F ⊃ G), and (F ⊃ G) ∈ E(Γ, t). Likewise since Γ  s:F , ∆  F and
F ∈ E(Γ, s). Then ∆  G, of course. Also, G ∈ E(Γ, t) · E(Γ, s) ⊆ E(Γ, t · s),
by the Application Condition on models. It follows that Γ  (t · s):G.
Next, an intermediate result. I’ll show that if Γ  t:X and ΓR∆, then
∆  t:X too. So, suppose Γ  t:X and ΓR∆. Let Ω ∈ G be an arbitrary
state such that ∆RΩ. Since R is transitive, ΓRΩ, and so Ω  X. Also,
X ∈ E(Γ, t) so by the Monotonicity Condition for E , X ∈ E(∆, t). It follows
that ∆  t:X.
Now I’ll show the validity of a proof checker axiom, which needs the
result just shown. Suppose Γ ∈ G and Γ  t:X. I’ll show Γ !t:t:X. Well,
since Γ  t:X, X ∈ E(Γ, t), and hence t:X ∈ (!t)E(Γ, t) ⊆ E(Γ, !t), using the
Proof Checker condition on models. Also, by the previous paragraph t:X is
forced at every world accessible from Γ. It follows that Γ !t:t:X.
We have assumed a constant specification C, and I’m assumingM is an
LP model relative to C. If X is an axiom, we have now established that
X is forced at each state of M. If Γ ∈ G, and C(X) = c, by the Constant
Condition on models, X ∈ E(Γ, c). Also X is forced at every world accessible
from Γ, so Γ  c:X.
The only other rule is modus ponens, and it is trivial that it preserves
validity.
Note that we did not use the Fully Explanatory condition in this section.
5 Completeness
Completeness proceeds by a canonical model argument, adapted to LP. As
above, a constant specification C is assumed fixed both for proofs and for
the semantics, and it is used throughout what follows.
Call a set S of LP formulas inconsistent if there is some finite subset
{X1, . . . , Xn} ⊆ S such that (X1 ∧ . . . ∧Xn) ⊃ ⊥ is a theorem of LP. Call
S consistent if it is not inconsistent. Let G be the set of all maximally con-
sistent sets of LP formulas. If Γ ∈ G, let Γ# = {X | (t:X) ∈ Γ, for some t},
and set ΓR∆ if Γ# ⊆ ∆. This gives us a frame, 〈G,R〉. The ‘explicit re-
flexivity’ axiom scheme of LP implies the frame is reflexive, and the ‘proof
checker’ axiom scheme implies it is transitive. Define a mapping E by set-
ting E(Γ, t) = {X | t:X ∈ Γ}. Finally, define a forcing relation by specifying
that for an atomic formula P , Γ  P if and only if P ∈ Γ. This gives us a
structure M = 〈G,R, E ,〉.
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First I show M is a weak LP model. I’ll verify two of the conditions on
the evidence function E—other conditions are similar. To begin, I’ll verify
the Application Condition: for each Γ ∈ G, E(Γ, s) · E(Γ, t) ⊆ E(Γ, s · t).
Suppose Y ∈ E(Γ, s) · E(Γ, t). Then for some X we have X ∈ E(Γ, t) and
(X ⊃ Y ) ∈ E(Γ, s). By the present definition of E , we must have t:X ∈ Γ
and s : (X ⊃ Y ) ∈ Γ. Since s : (X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (t :X ⊃ (s · t) :Y ) is an LP
axiom, and Γ is maximally consistent, it follows that (s · t):Y ∈ Γ, and hence
Y ∈ E(Γ, s · t).
Next, I’ll verify the Monotonicity Condition. Suppose Γ,∆ ∈ G and
ΓR∆. Also assume X ∈ E(Γ, t). By definition of E , we have t:X ∈ Γ. Since
t:X ⊃!t:t:X is an LP axiom, we have !t:t:X ∈ Γ, and hence t:X ∈ Γ#. Since
ΓR∆ we have Γ# ⊆ ∆, so t:X ∈ ∆, and so X ∈ E(∆, t).
Other conditions are similar. Thus M is a weak LP model.
Now a Truth Lemma can be shown: for each formula X and each Γ ∈ G
X ∈ Γ⇐⇒ Γ  X.
Most of the cases are as usual. I’ll verify only the modal one. Suppose the
result is known for X, and we are considering the formula t:X.
Suppose first that t :X ∈ Γ. Then X ∈ Γ#, so if ∆ is an arbitrary
member of G with ΓR∆, we have Γ# ⊆ ∆ and hence X ∈ ∆. By the
induction hypothesis, ∆  X. Also since t:X ∈ Γ, we have X ∈ E(Γ, t). It
follows that Γ  t:X.
Next, suppose Γ  t:X. This case is trivial. By the present definition
of  we must have X ∈ E(Γ, t), and by definition of E , we must also have
t:X ∈ Γ.
Thus we have the Truth Lemma. At this point a completeness result
relative to weak LP models has been established. But in factM is a model,
and not just a weak one. I show this next.
Suppose Γ ∈ G and, for every ∆ ∈ G with ΓR∆ we have ∆  X. I’ll
show Γ  t:X for some t. Well, suppose not. Then for each proof polynomial
t, Γ  ¬(t:X) and so, by the Truth Lemma, ¬(t:X) ∈ Γ for each t.
The key item to show is that Γ# ∪ {¬X} is consistent. For then we can
extend it to a maximal consistent set ∆. By definition, ΓR∆, and by the
Truth Lemma, ∆ 6 X, contradicting the assumption. So I now concentrate
on showing this key item.
Suppose Γ#∪{¬X} is not consistent. Then for some Y1, . . . , Yk ∈ Γ#, LP
proves (Y1∧. . .∧Yk∧¬X) ⊃ ⊥, and hence LP also proves (Y1∧. . .∧Yk) ⊃ X.
For each i = 1, . . . , k, since Yi ∈ Γ#, there is some proof polynomial si such
that si:Yi ∈ Γ. Using the Lifting Lemma (5.4 in [2]) and the Substitution
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Lemma, there is a proof polynomial t such that LP proves (s1:Y1 ∧ . . . ∧ sk:
Yk) ⊃ t(s1, . . . , sk):X. Hence t(s1, . . . , sk):X ∈ Γ, but this contradicts the
original assumption that ¬t:X ∈ Γ for each t.
Thus M is an LP model. Now strong completeness follows as usual: if
S is consistent it is satisfiable. Extend S to a maximal consistent set Γ,
Γ ∈ G and, using the Truth Lemma, Γ  X for every X ∈ Γ, and hence S
is satisfied at Γ. Ordinary completeness is immediate. If X is not provable,
{¬X} is consistent, hence satisfiable, hence X is not valid.
6 Two Additional Results
In this section I use the semantics just introduced to give new proofs of two
results of Artemov, one simple, the other a bit more complex.
Suppose 〈G,R,〉 is an S4 model—R is reflexive and transitive—and 
is defined for atoms. Define a mapping E by setting E(Γ, t) to be the entire
set of LP formulas, for every Γ ∈ G and every proof polynomial t. It is
easy to check that this makes 〈G,R, E ,〉 into an LP model with respect
to any constant specification (not just a weak model). Following notation
of [2], if Y is a formula of LP, then Y ◦ is the monomodal formula that
results by replacing each subformula of the form t:Z with Z. It is easy to
check that for each LP formula X, and for each Γ ∈ G, Γ  X in the LP
model 〈G,R, E ,〉 if and only if Γ  X◦ in the S4 model 〈G,R,〉. (The
definition of  is the same at the atomic level in the S4 and LP models,
but the extension to all formulas differs, because of the different languages
involved.)
Theorem 6.1 If X is a theorem of LP, then X◦ is a theorem of S4.
Proof If X is a theorem of LP, then X is valid in all LP models, hence
in all models converted from S4 models, as outlined above. Since all S4
models convert to LP models, it follows that X◦ is valid in all S4 models,
and hence X◦ is a theorem of S4.
Note that the argument above did not need that the models converted
from S4 models are LP models—that they are weak LP models is enough.
The next result needs the stronger version.
Theorem 6.2 Suppose X is an LP theorem. Then for some proof polyno-
mial t, t:X is also an LP theorem.
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Proof Suppose X is an LP theorem, and hence valid in all LP models.
Also suppose that, for no proof polynomial t is t:X provable. I show this
leads to a contradiction.
First, I claim the set {¬t1:X,¬t2:X, . . .} is consistent, where {t1, t2, . . .}
is the set of all proof polynomials. The argument is as follows. If the set were
not consistent, there would be a finite subset {¬ti1:X, . . . ,¬tik:X} such that
(¬ti1:X ∧ . . .∧¬tik:X) ⊃ ⊥ is an LP theorem. Then ti1:X ∨ . . .∨ tik:X would
be an LP theorem. It follows by using the Sum axiom that (ti1 + . . .+ tik:)X
would also be an LP theorem, but this contradicts the assumption that for
no proof polynomial t is t:X provable.
Since the set {¬t1:X,¬t2:X, . . .} is consistent, there is an LP model in
which it is satisfiable. Say that in 〈G,R, E ,〉, for Γ ∈ G, Γ 6 ti:X for each
proof polynomial ti. But since our assumption is that X is valid, for every
∆ ∈ G with ΓR∆ we have ∆  X. Then the Fully Explanatory condition
says we must have Γ  t :X for some proof polynomial t, and this is our
contradiction.
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